In this paper, we consider the privacy issue in cloud systems by using Homomorphic Encryption (HE) to provide secure computing at the cloud side. We use Domingo Ferrer (DF) homomorphic scheme to accomplish this task. Before implementing DF in a cloud scenario, we resolve its main problems. The two concerned problems are sensitivity to known plain-text attack and cipher-text dimension growth after homomorphic multiplication causing high storage overhead and reducing the scheme efficiency. DF is first made secure for cloud systems by making the scheme much more resistant to the concerned attack due to the change of the encryption procedure. Second, DF is made efficient for cloud computing by introducing a new technique, called Key Switching (KS). This technique reduces the high overhead by decreasing the extended cipher-text dimension obtained after a homomorphic multiplication and preserving the homomorphic behavior. While users' privacy at the Cloud side is preserved with HE, KS technique relies on publishing a matrix M. Different secret keys are encrypted within M based on the hardness of Learning With Error (LWE). A deep crypt-analysis and implementations under Python using SageMath Library are done in order to validate the efficiency of our proposal.
INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is formed of an embedded system of different configurable computers that provide services over the internet with a low cost of management. Cloud systems rely on sharing different resources to give better opportunities for outsourcing of storage and computation. Users' privacy at the Cloud side becomes critical when computation over the encrypted stored data is required. In this case, they are obliged to reveal some of their secret parameters in order to perform arithmetic operations over their sensitive data after decrypting it, then re-encrypting. An appropriate solution for this problem is Homomorphic Encryption (HE) since it allows non trusted parties to perform computations over encrypted data. This new type of encryption is suitable for Cloud computing (Chauhan et al., 2015) and used in several real world applications such as medical application (Kocabas and Soyata, 2014) , etc. A cryptographic scheme having an encryption function Enc is said to be homomorphic -0002-1106-7409 if the evaluation of a circuit C satisfies the relation Enc( f (X)) = f (Enc(X)), where f is the function that performs the circuit C and X = [x 1 , x 2 , ....., x l ] is a tuple of l input plain-texts. C is an electrical circuit that can be expressed in Boolean form. The function f should therefore have a polynomial form containing addition and multiplication operations. As a conclusion, building a Fully Homomoprhic Encryption (FHE) scheme is done by satisfying the two following properties:
Addition
Enc K (x 1 + x 2 ) = Enc K (x 1 ) + Enc K (x 2 ) (1)
Multiplication
where Enc K is the encryption function under a secret key K and (x 1 , x 2 ) are two plain-texts.
The notion of HE first appeared with the RSA scheme in (Rivest et al., 1978) . Several researchers worked afterwards on the challenge of creating a HE scheme that provides simultaneously efficiency and robustness. Jospeh Domimgo Ferrer published in (Domingo-Ferrer, 2002) a HE scheme based on polynomial calculations. The most valued work was introduced by the IBM researcher Craig Gentry in (Gentry, 2009 ) where he introduced the first theoretical FHE scheme that supports unbounded number of circuit depth and his work consisted on lattice based cryptography. Following Gentry works, several algorithms were born such as the DGHV scheme (van Dijk et al., 2010) , (Hariss et al., 2017 ) that works over the integers. DGHV suffers from high computational complexity, public key size can attain 2.3 Gigabytes and with an optimized implementation on a high-end workstation, key generation takes 2.2 hours, encryption takes 3 minutes, and cipher-text refresh takes 30 minutes as given in (Coron et al., 2011) . Cryptanalysis has also shown that DGHV is sensitive to Greatest Common Divisor (GACD) attack (Chen and Nguyen, 2012) . BGV (Brakerski et al., 2012) , (Hariss et al., 2017 ) is another FHE scheme that works over lattices where its computational complexity is also given by large poly-logarithmic factors. A wide state of art regarding HE is given in (Martins et al., 2017) , (Aguilar-Melchor et al., 2013) .
In this paper, we focus on Domingo Ferrer (DF) encryption scheme introduced in (Domingo-Ferrer, 2002 ) that suffers from two main vulnerabilities: 1. Sensitivity to known plain-text attack: the scheme is sensitive to this attack due to its algebraic structure as given in (Wagner, 2003) . 2. Cipher Expansion: homomorphic multiplication is a polynomial multiplication that increases the cipher dimension exponentially after each operation. Thus causing a high storage overhead and reducing the scheme efficiency. We propose to make DF suitable for Cloud systems first by enhancing its security level after modifying its encryption procedure to make it much more resistant against known plain-text attack. Second, we reduce the high overhead, by using a new technique called KS (Brakerski et al., 2012 ) based on publishing a new matrix M. Using this public matrix M, a new cipher c f resh under a new secret key K f resh can be obtained such that c f resh = M × c where dimension(c f resh ) < dimension(c) and Dec K f resh (c f resh ) = Dec K (c) (c is a cipher with high storage overhead with respect to a secret key K with high storage overhead). Different secret parameters are encrypted within the public matrix M profiting from the hardness of Learning With Error (LW E) (Regev, 2009) .
The rest of this paper is organized as follow: in section 2, the basic DF encryption scheme (DomingoFerrer, 2002 ) is explained, then we introduce the LW E problem given in (Regev, 2009) . In section 3, the two main problems of DF are solved as given above.
Crypt-analysis is given in section 4 where leveraging the resistance of the scheme against known plaintext attack is validated, and the security level of KS is investigated. Implementations under Python using SAGEMath Library are given in section 5 in order to validate the performance of our proposal for Cloud systems. Finally conclusion and future works are listed in section 6.
PRELIMINARIES
2.1 DF Encryption Scheme 2.1.1 Encryption Parameters
As stated in (Domingo-Ferrer, 2002) , starting from a security parameter λ, different parameters are defined:
1. public modulus m ≥ 10 200 that have many small divisors.
2. public integer d > 2 represents the cipher-texts dimension.
3. secret modulus m should be a small divisor of the public modulus m (m = (m ) λ ).
4. secret key r ∈ Z m invertible by the multiplicative law in the public ring Z m .
Encryption Procedure
Consider a plain-text a ∈ Z m , the encryption is given by two steps: Starting from 2 l cipher-texts of dimension d and after evaluating the multiplicative circuit of depth l given in Fig. 1 . The cipher-text dimension becomes 2 l (d − 1) + 1. Thus dimension grows exponentially with homomorphic multiplication. This problem will be solved in section 3 after introducing the KS technique. The security of KS is based on the hardness of LW E presented below.
Learning With Error (LWE)
2.2.1 LWE Problem LW E is a machine learning problem introduced by Oded Regev in (Regev, 2009) . In LW E, we need to learn the secret values of a vector s from a sample of the form (a i , < s, a i > +e i ), where a i are uniformly chosen from Z (1,n) q , e i is a noise distribution over Z q , n is the dimension and q is the modulus.
In LW E, we define the Search Problem by:
given p noisy random inner products: 
Where e i ← χ=Gaussian Distribution over Z q . 
LWE Matrix Form

Suppose that we have the matrix
The LW E problem given in Eq. 3 can be written based on the following matrix form:
Eq. 4 can be seen as a lattice equation, where s t A forms the lattice points. As a lattice based cryptography, e t can be considered as a plain-text encrypted under a secret key s t to obtain its corresponding cipher-text b t . Decryption is a Closest Vector Problem (CV P) that consists of finding the closest lattice point to b t which can simply be resolved only when having the secret key s t . Starting from a security parameter λ, the security of LW E resides in taking the dimension n ∼ poly(λ) and the modulus q ∼ poly(n) and using poly(n) equations as given in (Brakerski et al., 2012) , (Regev, 2009 ).
ENHANCING DF ENCRYPTION SCHEME
In this section, the two main problems of the DF scheme (know plain-text attack and cipher-text expansion) are investigated. First the security level of the basic scheme given in (Domingo-Ferrer, 2002 ) is enhanced by changing the encryption procedure, then a new technique called KS is introduced. KS reduces the storage overhead of the cipher-text after each homomoprhic multiplication without altering the homomorphic behavior of the scheme or changing the primitive plain-text.
Enhancing The Security Level
New Encryption Procedure
Starting from a plain-text a ∈ Z m , the first step is kept the same by randomly decomposing the plain-text
The second step is modified by using a vector s of d secret invertible keys as follow s = [r 1 , r 2 , ...., r d ] instead of using d powers of one invertible secret key r (i.e. [r, r 2 , r 3 , ....., r d ]). The cipher-text π will be π = [a 1 r 1 , a 2 r 2 , a 3 r 3 , ....., a d r d ] (mod(m)). π can be written in a multi-variate polynomial form:
We refer to Basic DF, the primitive scheme explained in (Domingo-Ferrer, 2002) , while Modified DF refers to the new encryption procedure.
An Efficient FHE Scheme to Secure Cloud Computing 
Decryption Procedure
Having the secret parameters (m , s = [r 1 , r 2 , ..., r d ]), decryption at the classified level can be done by multiplying π(i) by r i −1 to obtain
Homomorphic Properties
Starting from two plain-texts a 1 , a 2 , the two respective cipher-texts using Modified DF for a 1 and a 2 are:
1 r 2 , ...., a
1. Addition: Using multi-variate polynomial addition, π 1+2 = π 1 + π 2 can be written as:
and the modified scheme is additive homomorphic.
2. Multiplication: Using multi-variate polynomial multiplication, π 1×2 = π 1 × π 2 can be written as:
We can demonstrate that the cipher-text dimension after homomorphic multiplication with Modified DF will be N = C
+d.
N will be reduced to d after introducing KS technique.
To decrypt π 1×2 , an extended version of the secret key
The decryption of π 1×2 is done applying the following inner product:
where s * inverse = [r −1 mod(m), r ∈ s * ]. Based on Eq.5, we can validate that Dec s (π 1 × π 2 ) = Dec s (π 1 ) × Dec s (π 2 ) and the new encryption procedure is multiplicative homomorphic. 
KS Technique
As it is mentioned previously, with homomorphic multiplication the cipher-text dimension in both cases (basic or modified) will expand into a bigger value than the initial cipher-text dimension d. The main concept of KS is that having an extended cipher-text c * with dimension N, with respect to an extended secret key s * also with dimension N, a new cipher-text c of dimension d with respect to a new secret key s with dimension d should be calculated verifying this equation:
The main idea is to publish an encryption matrix M ∈ Z 
The new secret key is s = [r 1 , r 2 , ....., It is clear from matrix b, that the secret key s * is encrypted within the public matrix M based on the hardness of LW E using the new secret key s , where m is the secret modulus, and e = [e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , ..., e N−1 , e N ] is random noise matrix.
Given that c = Mc * , we can demonstrate that:
, where k ∈ Z. Hence Eq.6 is verified.
CRYPT-ANALYSIS
In this section, crypt-analysis is firstly done by studying the algebraic structure of the modified scheme to show that it is more robust than the basic one. Secondly, by examining the security level of the public matrix M used in KS technique. M should not leak any useful information about secret keys (s, s , m ) encrypted within it.
Known Plain-text Attack
Polynomial Resultant
Before analyzing the algebraic structure of the scheme, a brief overview on uni-variate and multivariate polynomial's resultants is given, as it is mandatory in our crypt-analysis. 1. Uni-variate Polynomial:
Starting from two uni-variate polynomials f and g:
As given in (Sylvester, 1851) , the resultant of f and g with respect to x is a function of the coefficients of f (x) and g(x) and defined by this equation:
where f (α i ) = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and g(β j ) = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Lemma 1. The resultant of f (x) and g(x) is equal to zero if and only if the two polynomials share a common root.
As mentioned in (Sylvester, 1851) , a practical way to calculate the resultant of two uni-variate polynomials is to calculate the determinant of the (n + m) × (n + m) Sylvester matrix defined by:
a n a n−1 a n−2 ......... a 0 a n a n− 
Zeros fill the blank spaces, the first m rows of Syl( f , g, x) are populated by the coefficients of f (x), and the last n rows are filled with the coefficients of g(x).
Multi-variate Polynomial:
Resultant of multi-variate polynomials was investigated widely in the literature for both homogeneous and non homogeneous cases. In our case, we will focus only on the homogeneous case. As a practical way for calculating the resultant of n multi-variate polynomials ( f 1 , f 2 , ...., f n−1 , f n ) with n different variables (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , ...., x n ) was given in (Allgower et al., 1992) . Having the Eq.9's system formed of n linear homogeneous polynomials with n different variables.
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The resultant of ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , ... f n ) with respect to (x 1 , x 2 , ....., x n ) is equal to the determinant of the matrix W = (w i, j ) = Coe f f j ( f i ), where (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and (1 ≤ j ≤ n).
If the determinant of the matrix W is equal to 0, in this case the n linear polynomials f 1 , f 2 , .... f n share a common root (x 0 1 , x 0 2 , ......x 0 n ).
Equivalence Key
Given that the secret key for modified DF is 
where 0 ≤ k ≤ d.
Adding to the system of Eq. 10 an extra parameter r d+1 = 1, gives birth to a new system formed of (d + 1) equations with (d + 1) unknowns given in Eq.11.
where
It is very sure that the (d + 1) multi-variate homogeneous polynomials of Eq.11 share a common root (r 
Recovering the Secret Modulus m :
The procedure listed in the previous section is repeated 2 × poly(λ) times to build 2 × poly(λ)
Depending on the well known fact given in (Vogel, 2010) that having two large integers a and b, gcd(a, b) = 1 is achieved with a probability close to 6 π 2 . Based on this fact, the probability to pick randomly {T j , T k } ⊂ T having gcd(T j , T k ) = m is close to 6 π 2 . Hence the probability to obtain at least one m among the values of Y is close
π 2 ) poly(λ) ). Finally m is the most common vote among the poly(λ) values of Y .
Recovering the Equivalent Secret Key:
After revealing the secret modulus m , the equivalent secret key to be recovered is [r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , ....., r d ] where r i = r i mod(m ). To do this, from the M couples of plain-text/cipher-text, d couples are picked to form the linear system of Eq.12.
Finding the equivalent secret key can be achieved by solving this linear system. This is only possible when its relative matrix is invertible in the ring Z m . Based on (Brent and McKay, 1987) , given a prime number p, the probability f (p) to find an invertible matrix in the ring Z p is at least k . In this case, the probability of finding an invertible matrix in
. After finding the invertible matrix in ring Z m , the system of Eq. 12 can be resolved using Gaussian elimination with O(d 3 (log(m ) 2 ).
As a conclusion, Modified DF is secure against this attack only when M, the number of couples plain-text/cipher-text, is lower than d.
Comparison between Basic and Modified DF in Terms of Security Level
In this section, we will show that the Modified DF is more robust that Basic DF.
Recovering m :
Recovering m for Basic DF is based on univariate polynomials. Sylvester matrix given in section 4.1.1 needs 2 polynomials instead of (d + 1). To recover the secret key m with a proba- 
KS Security
In this section the hardness of LW E is investigated because KS security depends on it. Different secret keys s * , s = [r 1 |(t ) 
We recall that Z m is the public ring and N = C 2 d + d. To reveal secret and random values in the public matrix M, an attacker can build from the matrix b a linear system of N equations having (2d +N +1) unknowns. This system have infinite solutions which makes recovering the secret keys infeasible especially when taking high values and respecting the security conditions of LW E given in section 2. In addition within the public matrix b, m e + s * inverse is considered as a plain-text encrypted under the secret key s . Decryption is a hard lattice problem (CV P) where resolving it can be done only when knowing the secret s (Brakerski et al., 2012) , (Regev, 2009 ).
EXPERIMENTATIONS
In this section, our proposal is validated by doing different implementations of DF. All implementations are done under Python with SAGEMath Library using a machine having the following specification: CPU-Intel Xeon, E5-2630, 2.40 GHZ, 8 CORES, 128 GB RAM. Starting from a security parameter λ = 90, different parameters are taken as follows: dimension d is varied from 25 to 100 with step equal to 25, secret modulus m = 336, public modulus m = (m ) λ = (336) 90 > 10 200 .
First Experimentation
In this experimentation, two different plain-texts a 1 , a 2 are taken from the plain-texts secret ring Z 336 , with two respective cipher-texts C 1 , C 2 obtained by applying Modified DF. Dimension d is varied from 25 to 100 as given above. By this implementation, the mean encryption time for 100 plain-texts , the mean decryption time for 100 cipher-texts, generation time of one public matrix M are calculated. Finally, we calculate C mult = C 1 × C 2 and using KS technique a new fresh cipher-text C = M × C mult is obtained, where Dimension(C ) < Dimension(C mult ) provided by the mean execution time of KS for 100 iterations. In Tab.1, we show dimension variation for different matrices in function of the public parameter d. Different execution times in function of the public parameter d are given in Tab. 2. Different results showed acceptable execution times for encryption, decryption and KS technique. Execution time increase with dimension d growth is already expected while providing a higher level of security. It is true that for different values of d in Tab. 2, matrix M generation is taking the highest value, but it is generated only once at the user side. User will execute encryption/decryption respectively for each couple of plaintext/cipher-text and KS is performed by the Cloud after each homomorphic multiplication.
Second Experimentation
In the second experimentation, the evaluation procedure of the Cloud circuit given in Fig. 1 Fig.2 , different execution times for the three implementations are drawn in function of circuit depth l and given in log scale just for making results much clearer. For circuit depth l higher than 6, which is the complex circuits case faced in real world applications, Basic DF Without KS is taking the highest execution time, afterwards comes Modified DF With KS, and the lower execution time is for Basic DF With KS (for example in linear scale, with l = 10 and l = 7 respectively, Basic DF Without KS took 6046.26 seconds respectively 73.619958 seconds, while Modified DF With KS took 261.21 seconds respectively 31.993578 seconds and Basic DF With KS took 14.57 seconds respectively 1.733248 seconds). This result is interpreted by the fact that for a circuit with high depth, Basic DF increases the storage overhead of ciphertexts due to homomorphic multiplications.
Starting from d = 50, cipher dimension grows exponentially in function of circuit depth l in the case of Basic DF Without KS (for example for l = 4 Cipher Dimension becomes 785 and for l = 10 Cipher Dimension becomes 50177), while it remains 50 for the two others cases while using KS. The new KS technique increases the efficiency of the scheme by reducing the storage overhead of ciphertexts. The difference in execution time between Basic DF with KS and Modified DF With KS is expected since the encryption is made more complicated to leverage the security level.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we modified DF in order to be suitable for Cloud applications by resolving its two main problems: sensitivity to known plain-text attack and cipher expansion after homomorphic multiplication. The first problem was resolved by changing the encryption procedure. Crypt-analysis has shown that the concerned attack becomes harder with the modified version.
The second problem was treated by building a new technique called KS that reduces the cipher-text dimension after each homomorphic multiplication. KS is based on publishing a matrix M where different secret parameters are encrypted within it based on the hardness of LW E. Crypt-analysis has shown no secret parameters leakage at the Cloud side.
Different implementations have validated our work since KS improved the behavior of the scheme in terms of execution time and storage overhead. Crypt-analysis of DF has shown that the scheme (Modified or Basic version) is secure against known plain-text attack with high values of dimension d and the public modulus m. Cloud systems can support these security requirements since they are formed of big data centers having intensive computation power and storing capabilities.
Future work will consider applying the Modified DF under LW E in a secure Cloud computing scenario for a medical health care and a university applications.
